Wednesday, September 17, 2014

9.17.2014 Tennessee Civil War Notes

        17-October 3, U. S. Evacuation of Cumberland Gap[1]

Report of Brig. Gen. W. Morgan,

U. S. Army, including operations August 16-October 3.


Greenupsburg, Ky., October 3, 1862.

GEN.: On the night of the 17th of September, with the army of Stevenson 3 miles in my front, with Bragg and Marshall on my flanks, and Kirby Smith in my rear, my command marched from Cumberland Gap mid the explosion of mines and magazines and lighted by the blaze of the store-houses of the commissary and quartermaster. The sight was grand. Stevenson was taken completely by surprise. At 5 o'clock p. m. on the 17th instant I sent him three official letters. The officers of our respective flags remained together in friendly chat for an hour. I have brought away all the guns but four 30-pounders, which were destroyed by knocking off the trunnions. During our march we were constantly enveloped by the enemy's cavalry, first by the Stevenson and since by the Morgan brigade. Throughout I maintained the offensive, and on one day marched twenty hours and on three successive nights drove Morgan's men from their supper. Morgan first assailed us in the rear and then passed to our front, blockading the road and destroying subsistence. For three successive days we were limited to the water of stagnant pools and that in small quantities. We expected to meet Humphrey Marshall at this place, but have been disappointed. Unless otherwise ordered I will proceed with my column to Camp Dennison to rest and refit.

With high respect,

GEORGE W. MORGAN, Brig.-Gen., Cmdg.

OR, Ser. I, Vol. 16, pt. I, p. 990.


This report indicates that land mines were used by the Union during their occupation of the Cumberland Gap.

Report of Capt. Jacob T. Foster, First Battery Wisconsin Light Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY, U. S. FORCES, Portland, Ohio, October 14, 1862.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor of submitting to you the following report of the march of the artillery force from Cumberland Gap, Tenn., to this place:

This force consisted of five batteries, to wit: Foster's First Wisconsin Battery, of six 10-pounder rifle guns; Wetmore's Ninth Ohio Battery, of six guns--two 10 and two 12 pounder guns, and two 12-pounder howitzers; Lanphere's Michigan battery, of six 10-pounder rifle guns; Webster's siege battery, of six 20-pounder Parrott guns, and Clingan's battery, of four 6-pounder guns--twenty-eight pieces in all. Lanphere's battery was ordered to accompany De Courcy's brigade to Manchester, Ky., on the 8th day of September, where it arrived on the 11th of September, and remained there until the 21st, when it marched with the balance of the division. On the 16th the Ninth Ohio Battery reported to Col. Coburn, Thirty-third Indiana Regiment, and marched with the same to Manchester, where they arrived on the 19th. On the 17th of September Foster's Wisconsin battery and Clingan's battery reported to Gen. Spears, and the siege battery to Gen. Carter, for orders, the latter battery marching at 11 p. m., Foster's and Clingan's batteries bringing up the rear about 1 a. m. of the 18th of September. On or about the 22d day of August all of the artillery horses that were fit for service, except enough for one section, were delivered to Col. Garrard, of the Third Kentucky Regiment, and taken to Manchester, Ky.; consequently it was necessary to use mules to transport the batteries. There were, however, about 100 horses which had been condemned as unfit for service but a short time before, which were assigned to the siege battery. The batteries all arrived at Manchester in good order, experiencing but little difficulty on the way. Here the siege battery received fifteen new horses, which strengthened the team very considerably. On the 21st of September the siege battery, with Gen. Baird's brigade, marched at 4 p. m.; Foster's and Clingan's batteries, with Gen. Spears' brigade, at 5 p. m.; the Ninth Ohio Battery, with Gen. Carter's brigade, at 9.30 p. m., and Lauphere's battery, with De Courcy's brigade, at 10 p. m. The roads were the roughest we had yet seen, but we experienced but little difficulty in passing over them. The advance halted at Clark's, about eleven miles from Manchester, at 11 p. m., and rested for the night. About 4 a. m. of the 22d a gun Carriage to the Ninth Ohio Battery was overturned, breaking an arm of one of the drivers. The ammunition in the limber-chest, from some cause--supposed to be by the ignition of a friction-primer--exploded, dangerously wounding two men and demolishing the limber-chest and wheels. At Proctor, Baird's brigade, with the siege battery, and Carter's brigade, with the Ninth Ohio Battery, left the traveled road to take a nearer route over an old road which had not been used for several years, and were to rejoin the brigades of Spears and De Courcy and the other batteries at Hazel Green, a distance of twenty-five miles. This road was in many places totally washed away, in others it had slidden [sic] into streams, and in others was filled with fallen trees and rocks. Wherever it led across a stream the last vestige of a bridge had been washed away, and the banks were considered by the inhabitants of the country as impassable. At the North Fork of the Kentucky River was a breach that would have caused anything less than men of iron wills to have given up in despair. The banks of the river on either side, being sandy, were washed by the floods until no vestige of a road could be seen other than the old road, which was upward of fifty feet above low-water mark. But Capt. Patterson, with his company of sappers and miners, assisted by Capt. Tidd, of the telegraph, and Capt. Douglas, of the Engineer Corps, and their commands, soon constructed a passable road, and within six hours from the time of our arrival at the river the whole train had passed over safely.

The march from Proctor to Hazel Green was made in three days over very rough roads which needed repairs more than half the distance. Water by this route was plenty, but not of a very excellent quality, being found in stagnant pools mostly. The batteries that went the traveled road suffered more for want of water, as they were obliged to march nearly the whole distance without a drop of water only as they could carry it with them. On Saturday, the 27th of September, the advance was fired into by bushwhackers and Morgan's cavalry. Lauphere's battery threw from thirty to forty shells into the woods at them, but with what effect is not known. On the 29th Carter's brigade, being in the advance, was fired into by a party of rebels from a point of woods. The siege battery was called forward and threw twenty-two shells into the woods from whence came the firing, the result of which was a skedaddle of rebels. Again in the evening of the 30th a squad of the Second Tennessee Regiment were after water and were fired upon by rebels and one captain wounded. Seven more shells were thrown by the siege battery, the result of which was skedaddling number two. On the same date, the 30th, the First Wisconsin Artillery shelled the rebels out of a piece of woods and captured 1,000 pounds of rebel bacon. From West Liberty to Grayson our way was frequently barricaded and front harassed by the notorious J. H. Morgan, but his barricades were taken out much faster than he could put them in, and he was crowded so closely that at Grayson he left us, saying:

"Tis no use trying to stop that d__d Yankee Morgan, for he can march over fallen trees faster than I can in good roads, and can take artillery where the d____ [sic] I can't go."

From Grayson to the Ohio River, twenty-five miles, the roads were much better than we had seen since leaving Manchester, and we arrived at Greenupsburg, Ky., on the 3d day of October, safe and in good condition, with all the artillery with which we left Cumberland Gap, except the ammunition chest of the Ninth Ohio Battery, which exploded, and one caisson abandoned at Grayson by Capt. Lauphere, with a broken stock. October 4 we crossed the Ohio River by ferrying the ammunition chests and fording with the Carriages, and camped in Haverhill, Ohio, before midnight.

Sunday, the 5th instant, left Haverhill about 9 a. m. for this place, where we arrived at noon on the 7th instant. Thus ended a march of upward of 200 miles through a region of country considered impracticable for an army, where water was very scarce, and subsistence, other than green corn and a few potatoes, was not to be had. Not a pound of flour was used by several of the batteries during the whole march, all their bread being made from "gritted" corn. Many of the men were barefooted and all were poorly clad, yet these men would march almost day and night with very little complaining, showing a degree of courage and fortitude worthy of emulation. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon Capt. Patterson and his command for the prompt and efficient manner in which he removed all obstacles to our safe and speedy progress.

J. T. FOSTER, Capt. and Chief of Artillery.

OR, Ser. I, Vol. 52, pt. I, pp. 49-51.


Sept. 18 - CUMBERLAND GAP EVACUATED. [sic] The Federals commenced burning their army stores last night at 8 o'clock. They blew up their magazines after midnight, and marched out before day. We advanced this morning and occupied the Gap, and found a great quantity of property destroyed, and some not destroyed. The enemy had spiked the guns in the forts on the mountain peaks, and they left a great number of sick in the Gap. We will move on in pursuit of them.

Diary of William E. Sloan.


HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF EAST TENNESSEE, Knoxville, Tenn., September 19, 1862.

Gen. BRAXTON BRAGG, Cmdg. Department No. 2:

GEN.: The enemy evacuated Cumberland Gap on the night of the 17th, after blowing up his magazine and destroying stores and small-arms in large quantities. He left six pieces of artillery, including two 4 1/2-inch Parrots. Gen. Stevenson, with two brigades and his cavalry, encamp on the bank of the Cumberland to-night. The convalescents, with ordnance and money train, left Clinton via Jamestown previous to the evacuation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[J. P. McCOWN,] Maj.-Gen.

OR, Ser. I, Vol. 16, pt. II, pp. 852-853.


KNOXVILLE, TENN., September 18, 1862.

Maj. Gen. SAMUEL JONES, Chattanooga, Tenn.:

Cumberland Gap evacuated by the enemy last night. Your troops not needed.

J. P. McCOWN, Maj.-Gen.

OR, Ser. I, Vol. 16, pt. II, p. 847.


CHATTANOOGA, TENN., September 19, 1862.


Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:

Gen. McCown telegraphs that Cumberland Gap was evacuated night before last and my troops not needed. Gen. Maxey's command will proceed by Knoxville to Kentucky, taking all spare arms with him.

SAM. JONES, Maj.-Gen.

OR, Ser. I, Vol. 16, pt. II, p. 854.


Mobile, Sept. 20.-A special dispatch to the Advertiser and Register, dated Knoxville, 19th, says that the enemy evacuated Cumberland Gap on Wednesday night [17th], blowing up their magazine, destroying all their property, and blasting rock to block the roads. They are retreating by the Harland road to Kentucky.-Our forces are pursuing them at Cumberland Ford and Baptist Gap.

Andy Johnson's family who were at Greenville, East Tennessee, within our lines, have been permitted by order of the Secretary of War to return the enemy's lines.

Chattanooga, Sept. 20.-On the 7th the Yankees evacuated Cumberland Gap, destroying all their stores and blasting rocks so as to block up the roads.

Georgia Weekly Telegraph, September 26, 1862.



        17, Rumors of war, Federal arrest of newspaper editor in Cleveland

A pretty day….Mother and I went out to Uncle Caswell's this morn. Mary Elizabeth came out and told us they were looking for 10,000 rebels, she and I stayed out there all day….Mr. McNelley[2] came home this eve. Mother and Sister went there after tea, they arrested him whilst they were there. Dr. Hughes here tonight to tell Sister and Mother that they are to be arrested tomorrow morn for being at Mr. McNelley's

Diary of Myra Adelaide Inman.

        17, 18863 -  "VAGABOND NEGROES."

What is to become of the swarms of negro men and children that are "lying about" the city? The government, we know, feeds and clothes, and controls those in its employment, but there are perhaps some thousand in Nashville and its environs, who upon the approach of winter must perish or stealing they can do. Before the war such was the abundance in Middle Tennessee, that there was little difficulty in procuring a subsistence either by theft or begging. Nobody, either black or white could have been allowed to starve. But all this is now changed. There is not food in Middle Tennessee to keep life in resident population, and scarcely any money with which to purchase it elsewhere. The wealthy can live in any time-those in moderate circumstances will be straightened to keep soul land body together. Where will be any surplus to be stolen or bestowed in charity?

Half of these negroes [sic] cannot work, and the other half will not; and if they could and would, scarcely anyone can give them employment. From October to April very few persons could afford to feed and clothe even a stout man or woman for their services. With wood at forty dollars per cord, and a bad chance to get that forty dollars, most men will prefer to make their own fires rather than incur the expense of an additional fire for a darkey [sic] to doze over. Yet, the thrifty mater familias [sic] will conclude that there is no economy in giving away half of the scant supplies for her household for a lazy wench to cook dinner; so she will just tuck up her sleeves and go at it herself.

There is no possible way in which this vagrant population of darkies can have adequate food, clothing and shelter during the winter, unless the Federal military authorities shall think proper to subsist them from the Commissary stores. Neither in the city nor in the surrounding country are the people able to do it; and no sort of coercion can wring from them what they haven't got.

Just here somebody says, cui bono? If there is no remedy for the mischief, what is the use to preach about it? If they must die, let them die and be done with it. No, sir; it must not pass into history that thousands or even hundreds of human beings perished from hunger and cold in the City of Nashville, in the winter of 1863-64. This stigma upon the civilization of the age, and country must be prevented, if, by possibility, it may be. And we hope something to the purpose may be accomplished, if the matter is taken up in time. If neither the Corporation of Nashville, nor the military authorities, can or will provide for the case, what then?

This is a hard question, but we must not surrender to the difficulty. Suppose these helpless people were sent back to their homes, if not too distant, or to sections of the country, where the means of living have not been exhausted by the presence of an army. Either their owners or other person would probably give then a support in return for their work. A register must be kept of names, ages, etc., by which they might, at any time, be identified and reclaimed. If only a part of them could be so disposed of, the pressure and burden at Nashville would be so far relieved. We offer this crude suggestion to be improved by the judgement [sic] and experience of others, or to be altogether rejected for any better plan that may be furnished.

We insist that something shall be done, and that speedily, if we would escape being witnesses to a scene of horrors that will haunt us for the remainder of life.

Nashville Daily Press, September 17, 1863.


        17, Report of Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy, U. S. Army, commanding Defenses of Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, of operations during Wheeler's raid.

HDQRS. DEFENSES NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA R. R., Tullahoma, Tenn., September 17, 1864.

MAJ.: In obedience to the order of the major-general commanding the District of Tennessee to report my operations after Wheeler, I will state I had no operation after Wheeler, but operated to a small extent after Williams who, I understand, was one of Wheeler's generals, and I respectfully submit the following statement of said operations:

Maj. Waters, of the Fifth Tennessee Cavalry, stationed at McMinnville, with three companies of his regiment, was attacked at that place on the 29th ultimo by some 300 rebel cavalry and guerrillas, under Col. Dibrell, and after a skirmish of some three hours, he was driven out with the loss of 1 man killed and 1 wounded, and about 10 were captured, consisting mostly of sick in the hospital. I had some days previous withdrawn from that place all the quartermaster's and hospital stores. I instructed Maj. Waters to keep vigilant pickets well out on the road eastward, and upon the approach of any force of the enemy to skirmish with them sufficiently to ascertain that they were in strong force, and upon ascertaining that fact to at once send off his transportation and camp equipage, with such Union citizens as wished to come away, to this place, and to cover their withdrawal to this place but Maj. Waters after being attacked continued skirmishing, supposing he could hold the place, till he was nearly surrounded, and barely escaped with his men and two small mountain howitzers, losing his camp equipage and 10 wagons and 1 ambulance, with 3 teams. Having learned late in the evening of the 29th that Maj. Waters was attacked, I started the remainder of the Fifth Tennessee Cavalry, together with the Tenth and Twelfth, which had recently come over from Pulaski, under Lieut.-Col. Clift, to his rescue, but they met him at Manchester and did not go any farther. On the night of the 30th the railroad and telegraph line between this and Murfreesborough was cut, some four miles from Bell Buckle. I sent down a reconnoitering party of soldiers on the 31st to examine and report extent of the damage and to drive off the enemy, if any. They returned and reported in the evening. I sent down a string party the next day on a construction train, who soon succeeded in repairing the track. I also on the same day sent a construction train, with a guard, in charge of Capt. Baird, my inspector, to repair the track and telegraph line, which had been cut between Decherd and Cowan the night previous. The damage here being but slight was soon repaired and Capt. Baird went on down to Stevenson, and there met Gen. Steedman with a force of some 3,000 infantry on trains, and ordered Gen. Steedman to come through this way to the assistance of Gen. Rousseau instead of going around by Decatur and up the Tennessee and Alabama Central Railroad. Gen. Steedman passed this place in the evening, and hearing that Gen. Rousseau was hotly engaged against overwhelming force of cavalry under Wheeler between Murfreesborough and Nashville, I deemed it best to throw all the cavalry I had to his assistance, and started the Fifth and Twelfth Tennessee to march through, via Murfreesborough, and ordered the Tenth Tennessee up from Decherd, where I had sent it, to be sent after the Fifth and Tenth on a railroad train. It was about 12 o'clock before I succeeded in getting the horses and men of the Tenth together, with two mountain howitzers belonging to the Fifth, the regiment and horses on the large train and the artillery and horses on a small train attached. I went with the greater portion of my staff with the regiment. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 2d instant, when within about six miles of Murfreesborough, the train ran into a large wood pile that had been thrown on the track, and soon after the rebels opened fire on the two trains. I sprang out and commenced giving commands in a loud voice to different regiments to form line of battle to the right and left of the train. The rebels hearing this, and my men returning their fire pretty effectively from their carbines, supposed, from the length of our train, that we had a large force and beat a hasty retreat and left us at liberty to throw the wood off the track and go on to Murfreesborough, where we arrived at daylight. We killed 1 rebel and captured another in the attack, from whom we learned that we had been attacked by two regiments. I met Col. Spalding at Murfreesborough, who had arrived there during the night with orders from Maj.-Gen. Rousseau to bring the two cavalry regiments to join him as soon as possible in pursuit of Wheeler. Previous to meeting Col. Spalding with this order, I had determined to search after the rebels that had attacked our train, but after waiting here I doubted my authority to withhold the regiments from joining Gen. Rousseau, and concluded to go with them to him in hopes of getting some command in the pursuit. We started in the evening and lost our way in the night, and had to retrace our steps some six miles; rested and slept a few hours before day [3d]; received a dispatch from Gen. Steedman at daybreak, saying that he was confronted by a large rebel cavalry force on the railroad at Stewart's Creek and desired for cavalry to help him bag them. I thought it best to go to him at once. I arrived at Gen. Steedman's quarters about 8 o'clock, and he reported the enemy still in strong force in his front, and suggested that I divide the cavalry and send out a portion around the flanks of the enemy to drive them in, while he would attack them with his infantry and artillery in front. I accordingly divided my cavalry and sent them around and commenced driving them in, but no rebels were found. After several hours my scouting parties reported they were several miles off to the southeast, passing through Jefferson. I at once put the cavalry in pursuit, pushed on north of Jefferson, crossing Stone's River, until we struck the pike running west; followed this pike nearly north of Murfreesborough, when we turned toward that city and followed the enemy to within four miles of that city, when they turned square west again. It being about dark [3d] we soon afterward stopped to rest and feed. I directed Col. Spalding to have 100 men to push forward and to keep on the road of the enemy and watch his movements, and send couriers to pass us advises of their movements, and when they would stop, &c., and to move his command to town. His command was near to town, but the men were not sent in pursuit, the consequence of which was that we knew nothing of the enemy the next morning [4th] until the regiment, in seeking a corn-field for forage, overtook the enemy about 8 o'clock, camped about four miles from town between the Shelbyville and Salem pike. The brigade had been detained thus late in pressing horses and in getting shoeing done. After a slight skirmish the enemy commenced a hasty retreat; in about two miles they made a stand with three pieces of artillery and a strong rear guard, but after some brisk skirmishing they continued the retreat in a northwesterly direction, crossing the Salem pike, until they came to the road running west toward Triune, which they followed, hard pressed by the Tennessee cavalry and turning at bay every few miles and shelling our advancing column with their artillery, strongly supported. By taking up strong positions from time to time, they were thus enabled to hold us in check while the main column moved on. We found from the reports of citizens and of the wounded who fell into our hands and from stragglers captured that the rebel force was commanded by Williams, and was fully 2,000 strong, while the whole force with me was about 900. Had this force been properly disciplined that they could have been efficiently handled in action, the rebel battery could have been captured. Indeed I think this could have been done as they were had there been no question of my authority to enforce obedience to my orders, but from orders received by Col. Spalding from Gen. Rousseau there was some doubt in my mind on this point, but Col. Spalding, from the way my orders and suggestions were treated by him, appeared to have no doubt in his mind on this point. Our last fight with the rebels was at Triune, about 5 o'clock in the evening. [4th] At this point they turned south on the pike. Col. Spalding here reported to me that his brigade was short of ammunition and provisions, insisted that Williams would probably effect a junction with Wheeler during the night, and that it was his (Spalding's) duty to go to Franklin and form a junction with Gen. Rousseau as soon as possible. In order to do this I reluctantly consented. We arrived at Franklin at 10 o'clock. [4th] Ammunition was obtained from Nashville, horses were shod, and, being joined by a detachment of the Sixth Indiana, I pushed on in the evening and camped at Spring Hill. [5th] Passed through Columbia next day, the 6th, and learning that Gen. Rousseau had gone west after Wheeler, and not hearing of Williams crossing the railroad any place to join Wheeler, I found that he had gone back east and attacked the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. Having no authority to take the Tenth and Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry and Sixth Kentucky with me, I left them to go on to Gen. Rousseau, and pushed out that evening with the Fifth Tennessee and the detachment of the Sixth Kentucky in the direction of Tullahoma. I passed through Fayetteville the next day, [7th] captured 4 rebel soldiers, and arrived here on the morning of the 9th at 6.30 a. m. and found that Williams, after stopping a day at or in the vicinity of Farmington and Cornersville, and learning that my force and that of Gen.'s Rousseau and Granger were between him and Wheeler, who was pushing southwest, he turned east and passed through Shelbyville on the night of the 7th, and crossed the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad on the 8th in great haste, having been skirmished with and bushwhacked by Capt. Worther's gallant little company of home guards, who, after disputing the entrance of the rebels to Shelbyville, held them in check till all the Government stores in that place were removed and arrived in safety at this place, fell back to Elk River bridge. From this place they rallied and fired on the rebels, who hurried across the railroad in such haste that they did not interrupt the railroad track or telegraph wire. Learning on my arrival here that the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry had arrived at Murfreesborough, I telegraphed to Gen. Van Cleve to order that regiment to McMinnville, and ordered the Fifth Tennessee Cavalry to proceed from here to form a junction with the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry at McMinnville and pursue Williams. The Fifth Tennessee arrived at McMinnville on the 10th. I waited some hours, and the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry not arriving, moved down the pike toward Murfreesborough some seven or eight miles, and not meeting them, came on back here. The next day, [11th] receiving a dispatch from Col. Jordan that he was at McMinnville a waiting orders from me, I sent an order to wait until I could send the Fifth Tennessee Cavalry to join him with provisions for his command, and then to push on with the two regiments after Williams. The result of their pursuit has been made known to the general by a copy of the report of Col. Jordan sent him. I cannot speak too highly of the bravery, endurance, perseverance, and patience of the Tennessee cavalry regiments that were with me. With proper discipline they could not be excelled by ally troops. Inclosed I send you a copy of the report of Brig.-Gen. Van Cleve. I join with him in commending the efficiency of the block-house system for the defense of the railroad, which has been clearly demonstrated by the total failure of the raid to do any material damage. More block-houses are much needed at different points along the line. Upon this point I would call especial attention to the suggestion and recommendations in the report of Capt. Baird, my assistant inspector-general, recently forwarded. He has examined these matters with myself; and his views of the requirements of the defenses of this railroad I fully [indorse] and think of the first importance. I join with Gen. Van Cleve in commending the heroism of Lieut. Orr, of the One hundred and fifteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and Spartan band for their gallant and successful defense of Block-house No. 5, and recommend him for promotion for gallant conduct. It is with pain that I mention the death of the brave Lieut.-Col. Eifort, of the Second Kentucky, who received a mortal wound while gallantly leading a charge on the rebel battery and rear guard about noon on the 4th instant, of which he soon afterward died. The Tenth Tennessee Cavalry had been ordered to move around to the left of the rebel position and charge them in flank, while Col. Eifort, with the detachment of his own regiment and a portion of the Fifth Tennessee, went to charge them in front. After a sufficient time had been given the Tenth to get into position Col. Eifort charged forward in the most gallant style, but the Tenth had failed to get into position and charge simultaneously, as was intended. The consequence was that Col. Eifort was repulsed and driven back; and while the colonel was bravely trying to hold his men in the unequal fight, amid the enemy's guns, he was shot through the body. In his death society lost an ornament and the country a brave young officer of much promise. Inclosed I also send a copy of the report of Col. Boone, of the One hundred and fifteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

I have the honor, major, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. H. MILROY, Maj.-Gen.

OR, Ser. I, Vol. 38, pt. II, pp. 490-494.

        17, The restoration of the local judiciary in Memphis

Civil Jurisdiction.

We are gratified to announce the fact that Major General Washburn has ordered that all person now in confinement in military prisons in this district, for offenses against the statutes of the State of Tennessee, be turned over to the civil authorities for trial in the civil courts. Hereafter [sic] the military courts will be limited to the trial of offences against the United States Government. This will be received with satisfaction by our readers. Yesterday the following criminals were turned over to the civil authorities civil authorities by the Provost Marshal. They will be tried at the October term of the courts: John Dorty, murder; C.J. Harris, attempted to kill; Susan Mitchell, murder, Martha Palsey, attempt to poison; Hickey Pearsons, murder; W. Bolin, attempt to poison; Lewis Leech, larceny; Lewis Farley, attempt to poison; Bustabe Adler, burglary; and Delia Pearsons, murder.

Memphis Bulletin, September 17, 1864.

        17, "Hygenic [sic]."

About a week ago a young man arrived in Memphis from Dubuque, Iowa, and has since been acting as phonographic reporter of evidence before the Military Commission at� present in session here. As his labor is very confining during the day, he has been in the habit of taking a walk to the suburbs of the city each evening, for his health. Last night, having wandered as far as the point where Poplar street crosses the railroad, he was stopped by two men in soldier's uniform, who presented a revolver at his head, threatening to blow out his brains unless he gave up his money. As his money amounted to just ninety-five cents, which could soon be earned again, while it might not be so easy to replace the contents of his cranium, he chose to deliver the currency. They then relieved him of a silver watch, worth about $25, and ordered him to go on his way in silence. He made his way to the patrol guard as soon as possible, and a squad of men were sent out after the robbers, but they were not to be found.

Our short-hand friend has made the discovery that it is not good for the health to perambulate the suburbs in the evening.

Memphis Bulletin, September 17, 1864

[1] Including march of garrison to Greensburg, Kentucky (Brigadier-General George W. Morgan). This official report by Brigadier-General George W. Morgan (U. S.) gives a condensation of that evacuation, or withdrawal, or retreat, as a very harried affair. It is singular in that it refers to exploding mines, presumably "land mines," the presence of which have not been heralded by Civil War ordnance enthusiasts.

[2] McNelley, or McNally, was the editor of a Cleveland newspaper the "Cleveland Democratic Paper [sic

James B. Jones, Jr.

Public Historian

Tennessee Historical Commission

2941 Lebanon Road

Nashville, TN  37214

(615)-770-1090 ext. 123456

(615)-532-1549  FAX


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